Individual and national wealth accumulation is here modeled as a recurrently played game between randomly matched pairs of individuals from a large population. The simple game here studied represents exogenously and spontaneously arising productive opportunities, and the drawn individuals may seek cooperation or conflict over each opportunity. How does national wealth and the evolutionarily stable cooperation rate depend on natural resources and institutions? We show that the steady-state level of national wealth is not monotonically increasing with natural resources. We also study the evolution of the full wealth distribution. When the population is large, the distribution of individual wealth converges over time to a skewed distribution. We also analyze the effect of institutions and the possibility that wealthier individuals are more likely to win conflicts, including effects on national wealth and inequality.
Introduction
One of the determinants of national wealth and its distribution is, arguably, the availability and nature of natural resources. Hunter-gatherer societies differ from agricultural societies, which in turn differ from industrialized and post-industry societies. This paper develops a simple microeconomic model of individual and national wealth accumulation, with a focus on individuals' incentives to seek cooperation or conflict over available resources and production opportunities. More precisely, wealth accumulation is modelled as a symmetric game that is recurrently played between pairs of individuals who are randomly drawn from a large population. For the sake of definiteness and brevity, we focus on a few variants of the so-called Hawk-Dove game. This game (also called "Chicken") was used by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) as an illustration of the possibility of an evolutionarily stable mixed strategy in symmetric finite games. They considered the expected payoffs in case of a conflict, while we here consider the fully specified game in which one individual wins and the other loses. In addition, we consider versions that include (rudiments of) institutions as well as versions in which individuals may differ in fighting ability and this, in turn, may depend on personal wealth. Indeed, while they did not consider any population dynamics, the main focus here is on the induced population process under the presumption that the resource in question is storable, to be called wealth. Wealth depreciates (or is consumed) at a constant rate. National wealth is defined in per capita terms, as total population wealth divided by population size. One of our main findings is that national wealth is not monotonically related to the riches of the country. As the riches increase, steady-state national wealth first increases, then diminishes, then again increases. Hence, the model may provide yet another explanation for the "curse of the riches". Among existing explanations, the present model is perhaps closest to the "rent-seeking" explanation, see Torres et al. (2013) for a recent survey and discussion. 1 While individual may well be animals that contest resources, as in MaynardSmith's and Price's original contribution (see also Enquist and Leimar 1984 , 1987 , we here interpret the model in economic terms, imagining that each arrival of a Hawk-Dove game opportunity represents opportunities for co-production or trade that spontaneously arise in a large population living in a given natural and institutional environment. Whenever such an opportunity arises, each of the two individuals may seek "cooperation" (play "Dove") or "conflict" (play "Hawk"). If both seek cooperation, they split the value of the opportunity at hand in equal shares. If both seek conflict, one of them wins the opportunity (potentially at some cost) and the other individual makes a loss. In the base-line setting all individuals have the same probability to win such a fight, while in an extension, the probabilities may depend on individual wealth. If one individual seeks cooperation and the other conflict, the latter wins the opportunity and the former neither receives nor loses anything. In an extension of this basic model, we analyze the role for wealth creation of (societally costly) enforcement of a law against strategy "Hawk", with the implication that an individual who played H against D may be sued and have to pay a (potentially large) fine.
Our main contribution in this study, however, is methodological, namely to provide a mathematically rigorous model framework for analysis of stochastic population processes that involve perpetually recurring strategic interactions between individuals. Our model is therefore based on heroic simplifications that are not intended to be realistic but that permit us to establish powerful analytical results.
The material is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define a stochastic version of the Hawk-Dove game, and define a Markov process for individual wealth holdings in a finite and infinitely-lived population, a process that, at random arrival times involves pairwise strategic interactions and potential depreciation of individuals' wealth. In this and the next two sections we assume that all individuals have identical winning probabilities in fights and that they all use the unique evolutionarily stable strategy of the Hawk-Dove game. In Section 3 we first establish (in Theorem 1) that the so-defined wealth process is ergodic and converges from any initial wealth distribution to a unique invariant wealth distribution. We then (in Theorem 2) show that the larger the population, the less correlated are the wealth levels within in any finite group of individuals (of fixed size), and, in the limit as population size tends to infinity, these wealth levels become statistically independent and identically distributed. We also provide a system of ordinary differential equations for the probability distribution of a representative individual's wealth-in the limit of an infinitely large population-at any given point in time, a result that is valid with or without depreciation. Using these differential equations, we solve (in Corollary 1) for the evolution of the mean-value and variance of a representative individual's wealth in the limit of an infinite population. The evolution of per capita national wealth is analyzed and we provide a mean-field approximation (in Proposition 1) for large population. We also use this mean-field approximation to establish the above-mentioned "curse of the riches" result. Section 4 considers a few alternative strategies in the recurrently played Hawk-Dove game, in particular threshold strategies whereby individuals let their strategy depend on their own current wealth, by way of playing Hawk when rich and Dove when poor. By and large, the unique ESS of the Hawk-Dove game appears to resist "invasions" by such alternative strategies. Section 5 considers three extensions. First, we briefly study the effect of a potential law against strategy Hawk, with societally costly enforcement. For sufficiently low enforcement costs, this can raise national wealth (and potentially diminish inequality). Second, by way of numerical simulation we study the dynamics of national wealth and its distribution when "wealth means strength". It is seen how this may enhance national wealth (by avoiding fights between uneven contestants) and also (persistent) inequality. Third, we show how the algebra can be easily adapted to settings in which the strategic interaction at hand is not the only source of wealth. Section 6 concludes. All mathematical proof are given in an Appendix at the end of the paper.
Model
Consider a population consisting of a large finite number N of individuals who are now and then randomly matched in pairs to play a fully specified version of the classical Hawk-Dove game (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) . 2 This game is defined by two positive parameters, v and c, and each player has only two pure strategies, H ("hawk") and D ("dove"). The paired individuals make their strategy choices simultaneously. If both choose D, they each receive v/2 payoff units. If exactly one of them chooses H, then this player earns payoff v while the other loses or earns nothing. If both choose H, then one wins v and the other loses c, with equal probability for both individuals to be the "winner" of such a "fight". We will call the strategy profile DD compromise and the strategy profile HH fight. The game tree is shown in Figure 1 below. The material gains and losses to individual i are indicated above those of individual j. If both play H, then "nature" (player 0) makes a random draw, resulting in a "winner" and a "loser", with equal chance for both individuals. 3
Figure 1: The fully specified Hawk-Dove game Individuals accumulate their payoffs over time, and an individual's (positive or negative) stock of accumulated payoffs at any point in time is called the individual's current wealth. Hence, an individual i ∈ {1, ..., N } who enters an interaction with wealth w, exits the interaction with wealth w + v/2 if both play D, with wealth w + v if she plays H and the opponent plays D, and with unchanged wealth, w, if she plays D and the opponent plays H. If both play H, she will end up with either wealth w + v, which happens with probability one half, or with wealth w − c, while the the other individual in the match will end up with the reversed wealth levels. In terms of "national wealth", that is, total wealth in the population, all three strategy profiles DD, DH and HD thus results in an increase by v, while the strategy profile HH, a fight, results in a net increase of national wealth by v − c units. This simple and well-known game, though usually treated only in terms of expected payoffs and without any wealth dynamics, has a unique evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), namely to use pure strategy H with probability x * = min {1, v/c}. We assume throughout that c and v are positive integers. 4 We now turn to a specification of the associated stochastic wealth process. Individuals may condition their strategy choice in a match on their own current wealth and, on the current wealth distribution in the population at large. However, they may not condition their behavior on the opponent's current wealth (which the individual may not even know), nor on any earlier event, or on chronological time.
In addition to the above, we allow for the possibility that wealth stochastically depreciates over time at some constant (nonnegative) rate. By letting the amount of lost wealth via depreciation always take integer values, the state space of the process remains the same as without depreciation.
To be more precise, at each time t ∈ R + , the state of the wealth process
Likewise, average wealth, or, equivalently, per capita national wealth, is denotedW
The wealth process W N changes state precisely at the arrival times T 1 < T 2 < ... of the underlying Poisson process, which is stationary and has intensity λ = 2N . At each such arrival time, there is first a random draw. With probability one half one individual is uniformly randomly drawn for wealth depreciation. With probability one half, instead a pair of individuals is randomly drawn to play the game. This means that any given individual in the population is drawn for wealth depreciation at unit time rate and is drawn for game play at approximately twice that time rate; more precisely at rate N · (1/N + 1/(N − 1)).
In the first event, depreciation takes the form of depleting completely the selected individual's wealth, irrespective of it is positive or negative. 5 Thus, for any given wealth level W N i (T ) at the arrival time T of the Poisson process, either the individual's wealth remains intact, or it vanishes, with probability δ ∈ [0, 1] for the latter event. We will call δ the depreciation rate.
In the second event, that of a random pairwise match, two individuals from the population are uniformly randomly drawn to play the game. Depending on their strategy choices in the game G (v, c), and depending on who wins the fight if there is one, their wealth holdings change accordingly, as described above. In order to specify these strategic interactions in the pairwise matchings we define "behavior rules" that determine what individuals do in the game G (v, c) whenever it is their turn to play. By a (stationary) behavior rule for an individual i we here mean any Borel measurable function ξ i : Z × ∆ → [0, 1] that maps the individual's current wealth, W N i (t) ∈ Z and the current wealth distribution, µ N (t) ∈ ∆, where ∆ = y ∈ ∞ + (Z) :
for using strategy H in the individual's next random match (the first arrival time T ≥ t at which the individual is drawn for a match). Each individual i in the population is equipped with one such function ξ i and uses it throughout time. Let ξ = (ξ i ) N i=1 be the population profile of behavior rules.
The described events of depreciation and matching are all statistically independent. Given the underlying game G (v, c), the population profile ξ of behavior rules, and the depreciation probabilities δ, W N = W N (t) t∈R + constitutes a Markov process in Z N . 6 
The evolution of individual wealth
In this section we analyze statistical properties of the population wealth process under the presumption that all individuals always use the evolutionarily stable strategy in game G (v, c) , that is, use the behavior rule
Other behavior rules will be considered in Section 5.
We first consider its long-run behavior over time, at any fixed and given population size N ∈ N. A key question is history dependence. Can the wealth distribution go in different directions, depending on the initial wealth distribution? Our first result establishes that in the long run, this is not possible. Irrespective of what the initial distribution is, the wealth distribution will over time tend asymptotically to the same limit. Second, we consider how the wealth process behaves, at any fixed and given time, when the population size N is very large. More precisely, we analyze the law of motion of any given individual's wealth when population size N goes to infinity, for the case v < c. In order to state the result, we write L(X) for the probability distribution of a random variable X and (L(X i )) ⊗k for the (product) probability distribution of k such i.i.d. random variables X i .
Suppose that the initial individual wealth levels, the random variables 
Moreover, for any wealth level w ∈ Z and time t ∈ R + :
where D w = δ · P W (t) = w for all integers w = 0, and
The processW can be thought of as the wealth dynamics of a representative individual. The first part of this theorem, the convergence result (3), establishes that the larger the population, the less correlated are the wealth levels within in any finite group of individuals (of fixed size k), and, in the limit as population size tends to infinity, these wealth levels become statistically independent. Moreover, the probability distribution of each individual's wealth, W N 1 (t) at any given time t > 0, tends to the distribution of the random variableW as population size N tends to infinity. The evolution of this distribution over time is given in equation (4) . For any integer level of wealth w, P(W (t) = w) is the population share of individuals, in an infinite population, with that wealth level. The different terms in the evolution equation represent different "inflows" and "outflows" from any given wealth level w ∈ Z. More precisely, there are three inflows, from wealth levels w − v/2, w − v and w + c, and there are two outflows, one because individuals are drawn to play the game and one because of depreciation of wealth. The coefficients in equation (4) can be obtained from Figure 1 by multiplying probabilities downwards from the terminal nodes to the root of the tree, under the hypothesis that individual i at the root has wealth w, and using the fact that the average time rate of game-playing for an individual is 2 in the limit as N → ∞. The wealth level zero, however, is special if δ > 0 in that it has no depreciation outflow. Instead, it has an extra inflow, emanating from depreciation of the wealth of individuals with non-zero wealth. 8 In the absence of depreciation,
One may use equation (4) to derive the laws of motion for the first and second moments of the distribution of a representative individual's wealth W (t) at any point in time, granted δ > 0. Let
Corollary 3.3. If v < c and δ > 0, and if the initial distribution π has finite mean and variance, then there exist
From this we obtain the asymptotic mean value and variance:
We note that the asymptotic Sharpe ratio decreases with the depreciation rate and approaches unity as δ → 0: 9
This equation shows that the dispersion of wealth has two sources: on the one hand the strategic interaction, giving rise to individual gains and losses and resulting in unit Sharpe ratio, and deprecation of individual wealth, which increases the dispersion by now and then knocking away all wealth from an individual, resulting in a significant population share with wealth near zero. It is noteworthy that the wealth dispersion emanating from the strategic interaction does not depend on the game parameters v and c. We conjecture that this is due to the equilibrium nature of the assumed behavior rule. For if v < c, then the expected net wealth gain is the same for both pure strategies, irrespective of what values v and c have. The diagram shows how the drift, expressed analytically in (4), creates a spread of the wealth distribution, with a peak at zero wealth, due to our simplistic specification of how depreciation occurs; it is assumed to take randomly drawn individuals' wealth to zero every now and then. The empirical wealth distribution is apparently close to its steady-state distribution, as given in Theorem 3.1. We also note that the empirical steady-state distribution is quite screwed, with median far below the mean value: 6 versus 10.1.
The evolution of per capita national wealth
Having considered the full-dimensional population wealth process, we now turn to the evolution of national wealth, defined on a per capita basis. Let T be any arrival time of the Poisson process that drives the population process, and letW N (T ) be average wealth in the population at this time. Hence, "national" wealth, if the population represents a nation, is NW N (T ). At this arrival time, one of two equally probable events will take place: (A) one individual is selected for wealth depreciation, (B) a pair of individuals are selected to play the game G. In the first event (A), the wealth of one randomly drawn individual in the population is taken to zero with probability δ. Accordingly, average wealth in the population decreases by a random integer amount Y N , the expected value of which, conditional uponW N (T ), is δ ·W N (T )/N . In the second event (B), let
(8) This is the probability for a fight between the two individuals. Depending on the distribution of behavior rules, average wealth either increases by v/N (if they play DD, DH or HD) or changes by the (positive or negative) amount (v − c) /N (if they play HH), with probability p W N (t) for the latter.
In sum, average wealth at all times t in the interval until the next arrival time, T , or, more exactly, ∀t ∈ (T, T ], is
Suppose that each individual, when matched, strives to maximize his or her expected wealth gain in the interaction. It is easily verified from the payoffs in the game that H is then optimal if and only if the probability that one's opponent will play H, p W N (t) , does not exceed x * = min {1, v/c}. In particular, H is the unique optimal strategy if v > c. If v = c, then H is the unique optimal strategy if p W N (t) < 1, and both H and D are optimal 
The case v < c
In this classical case in evolutionary game theory the unique evolutionarily stable strategy is to play H with probability x * = v/c. If everybody else in the population uses this strategy, then it is an optimal strategy for each individual (presuming they strive to maximize the expected wealth gain in each interaction. Indeed, this is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy in the population game for any N . However, with N finite, there also exist other, asymmetric population equilibria. For instance, let N > 3, and suppose that individual 1 plays H, individual 2 plays D, and all others randomize and play H with probability
The probability that an opponent to any individual i > 3 will play H is then exactly v/c, which makes all such individuals indifferent between H and D. The probability that an opponent to individual 1 will play H is less than v/c, so H is that individual's unique best reply. Likewise, the probability that an opponent to player 2 will play H exceeds v/c, and thus D is that player's unique best reply. In sum, the population strategy profile (H, D, x, x, ..., x) constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the population game.
In the unique symmetric population equilibrium, the probability for conflict in each random match is q * = v 2 /c 2 . We conjecture that this probability is a good approximation of the probability of fights in all equilibria for N large. For even in the polar case to symmetric equilibrium, namely, when all individuals i < N v/c play H and the others D (and N v/c is not an integer), the probability of a fight in a random matching also tends to q * :
Another conjecture is that, when N is large, the average wealth process follows closely the solution trajectories of the mean-field equations. To make this precise, suppose that all individuals in all matches play the unique ESS, x * = v/c. Taking expectations in (9) suggests the following timehomogeneous ordinary differential equation for the dynamics of expected average wealth,
with initial state w (0) = w 0 . This mean-field equation has a unique solution, w(t) t≥0 , defined by
If the depreciation rate δ is positive, then this solution, irrespective of its initial state, converge, as t → +∞, to the unique steady-state level:
Moreover, in a well-defined sense, the solution to the mean-field equation (12) indeed is a good approximation of the stochastic process in large populations. In order to state this approximation result, let C ∞ c (R) denote the class of smooth functions f : R → R with compact support. Proposition 4.1. Suppose that δ > 0 and let w(t) t≥0 be the solution to (12) with initial value w 0 . For any t > 0 and any f ∈ C ∞ c (R):
We also note wealth increases linearly over time if the depreciation rate δ is zero. Then
for any initial wealth level w 0 ∈ R.
The case v > c
What happens if the opportunity value v exceeds the damage cost c? Then it is always optimal to play strategy H. Hence, the equilibrium probability for fights is 1. Suppose that this is what all individuals do. Then the the mean-field equation for average wealth becomeṡ
Accordingly, all solutions, irrespective of initial conditions, converge to the steady state level
The above approximation results hold as stated, with equation (12) replaced by equation (16). Also in this case average wealth increases linearly over time if δ = 0:
Comparative statics
Combining equations (14) and (17) we obtain the following general expression for the unique steady-state level of average wealth, associated with any positive depreciation rate δ:
Not surprisingly, the steady-state level of average wealth is lower the higher is its depreciation rate. However, the equation also shows a feature that may be less expected, namely, that steady-state average wealth, or, equivalently, national wealth, is non-monotonic in both the value v of opportunities and in the cost c of a lost conflict. This non-monotonicity is illustrated in the two diagrams below. Given c > 0, the steady-state level of average wealth is a parabolic function of the opportunity value v, with w * = 0 when v = 0 and also when v = c. The reason why w * is zero when v = c is that then all matched pairs have a conflict, and thus national wealth accumulation per match is then v − c = 0. Hence, national wealth depreciates toward zero over time from any initial level. Hence, national wealth is non-monotonic in v. The reason why w * is also non-monotonic in c, the damage in case of a lost conflict, is the other side of the same coin. One way to view this is to note that the equilibrium probability for conflict when c > v is v 2 /c 2 , a probability that falls faster than the damage c per conflict increases. In this sense, the more damage an individual who loses a conflict suffers, the fewer conflicts there G(v, c) are in equilibrium, and the wealthier will society be in steady state. Hence, contrary to what one might first think, a reduction of c, for example by some legal institutional arrangement or some insurance policy, may increase the frequency of fights and reduce the equilibrium level of national wealth.
All of the above concerns positive depreciation rates. We noted above that if instead the depreciation rate is zero, then average wealth grows linearly over time. When v < c, the growth rate is g = v (1 − v/c). This rate is increasing in c but non-monotonic in v, and maximal when v = c/2.
Threshold strategies
Here we explore more adaptive strategies, strategies adapted to the individual's own current wealth and on the current wealth distribution in the population. The first class of such strategies we here examine are dynamic threshold strategies, according to which the individual compares his or her current wealth with a threshold that may change over time and that may depends on the current empirical wealth-distribution at large. Formally, such a strategy is a function: ξ i of own wealth, W N i (t), and the wealth distribution, µ N (t), defined in (1), such that the individual i plays H if his or her wealth exceeds some threshold, τ i µ N (t) ∈ R, and otherwise plays D, where τ i is a Borel measurable function: now defined as in the model section, that is, as a probability:
A special case is when the threshold is constant, τ i (µ(t)) ≡ŵ i for some
Hence, an individual with such a threshold never goes "bankrupt". Another case is when the threshold is dynamic and such that τ i (µ(t)) equals the q i -quantile of the population's current wealth distribution, for some fixed quantile (as measured from the bottom of the distribution). A particularly interesting case for considerations of evolutionary stability is the v/c-quantile when v < c, since this results in the same probability for playing H as under the ESS x * (in the static Hawk-Dove game). Formally, let τ * be the threshold defined as the minimal wealth level such that
We proceed by way of computer simulations. Let N = 2000, v = 2, c = 4, and δ = 0.1. Hence, w * = α = 100. Figure 5 below shows average steadystate wealth in a population where initially all individuals use strategy x * and per-capita wealth is near its steady-state value. Suddenly 10% of the population switch to a threshold strategy adapted to the 30% bottom wealth quantile. The diagram suggests that these "mutants" on average fare less well than the incumbents. Figure 6 below shows a similar simulation experiment, but now the mutants instead use a threshold strategy adapted to the 50% quantile, that is, median wealth. They appear to fare about as well as the incumbents who use x * . The reason is that x * assigns probability v/c = 0.5 to play of H, and so does the mutant threshold strategy. This mutant strategy thus mimics strategy x * . Figure 7 below shows a similar simulation as in Figures 5 and 6 , but now the mutants instead use a fixed mixed strategy, assigning probability x = 0.9 to H. A single such mutant in a large population would fare (approximately) just as well as the incumbents, but since the mutants here make up 10% of the population they sometimes meet each other and then fight with each other with a higher probability than the incumbent, so their subpopulation Figure 6 : Mutants using threshold strategy adapted to the median wealth loses wealth at a higher rate than the incumbents. Hence, again strategy x * shows robustness against mutants. It is beyond the scope of this essay to probe deeper into evolutionary stability analysis. A topic for future research.
Extensions
We will briefly consider two extensions, where the first concerns the introduction of (embryonic forms of ) institutions, and the second concerns allowing for the (arguably realistic) possibility that higher personal wealth increases the chance of winning a fight.
Institutions
We here consider a simple generalization of the Hawk-Dove game in Figure 8 , see diagram below. The new parameters are a and b, where 0 ≤ a < 1/2 and b ≥ 0. The interpretation of a is institutional. It represents, in a simplistic way, enforcement of a law against strategy H, where now v is interpreted as the value of jointly owned asset, such as a partnership or business, and H is interpreted as an effort to steal the asset. In view of the possibility that the victim may bring the case to court and win the case, this reduces the expected value of playing H, when the other party plays D, from the full value of the asset, v, to (1 − a) v. The expected compensation of the victim is assumed to be av. Hence, the effect to wealth in society at large is zero. Evidently, a legal system and its enforcement is costly for society, a topic we will bring up shortly. The parameter b represents the realistic feature of fights that also the winner usually makes some loss, where we here take the expected loss to the share b of the asset's value. When both play H, we neglect the possibility that the case be brought to court. The original Hawk-Dove game is the special case when a = b = 0. The game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium if
namely, to play strategy H with probability
Moreover, this mixed strategy is evolutionarily stable. (Indeed, the normal form of the generalized game is a Hawk-Dove game.) We note that the equilibrium probability for H is decreasing in the legal enforcement parameter a and tends to zero as a → 1/2. Not surprisingly, the probability is also decreasing in the damage parameter b.
The steady state level of per capita wealth, in the base-line model given in (19), now becomes
Hence, national gross wealth, when not accounting for the societal costs of law enforcement, is increasing in the enforcement parameter a and in the damage parameter b. Although gross wealth is decreasing the damage parameter b when the probability for H is kept fixed, in equilibrium individuals reduce its probability sufficiently to make damages from fighting socially beneficial. Hence the beneficial effect of b. Law enforcement is of course in practice costly. Let C (a, x * ) be the per capita cost of enforcement a. Then national net wealth becomes 
When wealth is strength
So far, we have assumed that all individuals have the same chance of winning a fight. Arguably, wealthier individuals by and large have a higher probability of winning, against a given opponent, than poorer individuals. In the animal kingdom, "wealth" may simply be body weight or muscular mass, while among humans, wealth may consist in part in defence buildings, attack weaponry, or availability to good lawyers. We here only briefly outline how our base-line model can be generalized to allow for such dependencies.
As before, let v ∈ 2N, c ∈ N, and now assume v < c. Consider two individuals who are have been randomly matched, with wealth levels w 1 , w 2 ∈ Z. If both play D each gets a payoff v/2, and if one plays H and the other D, the H-player gets v and the D-player gets zero. However, if both play H, then player 1 "wins" with probability f (w 1 , w 2 ) and gains wealth v, while player 2 loses wealth c. With the complementary probability, 1 − f (w 1 , w 2 ), player 2 wins and 1 loses. We assume symmetry: f (w 2 , w 1 ) = 1 − f (w 1 , w 2 ). For the sake of concreteness, we focus on the special case when f : R 2 → [0, 1] is a logistic version of Tullock's contest function (reference to Tullock), defined by
for some λ ≥ 0. We note that this generalization includes the original HD game as the special case when λ = 0; then f (w 1 , w 2 ) ≡ 1/2. A number of plausible and relevant information scenarios open up. In one scenario, each individual only knows his or her own wealth, in another scenario, any two matched individuals perfectly observe each others' wealth. In a third scenario, covering the first two, each individual in a match knows her own wealth and receives a noisy private signal about the opponent's wealth. We here sketch how the second scenario can be analyzed within the present framework.
Assume, thus, that two individuals have just been matched, and they both know each other's wealth. For player i = 1, 2, strategy H strictly dominates D if and only if (v + c) f (w i , w j ) > c, or, equivalently if and only if
where j = i. The so defined game (under complete information) has the following Nash equilibria:
• Suppose that (27) holds for i = 1. Then the only Nash equilibrium is (H, D) , that is, the rich individual grabs the "cake" and the poor individual "yields".
• Suppose that (27) holds for i = 2. Then the only NE is (D, H) . Again the rich individual grabs the cake and the poor yields.
• Suppose that
Then there are three Nash equilibria: two strict, (H, D) an (D, H), and one mixed. In the latter equilibrium, player i = 1, 2 plays H with probability x * i ∈ (0, 1), defined by
In sum: when wealth levels are widely apart, then the poorer individual necessarily plays D and the richer individual takes home the whole "cake". When wealth levels are not widely apart, there are three "conventions". In one, the rich individual takes the cake, in another, the poor individual takes the cake, and i the third convention, they both randomize between H and D. 10 If the wealth levels happen to be identical, then we are back in the base-line model, since there is then no coordination device available to the pair of individuals (individual wealth serves as such a coordination device), and hence the arguably natural assumption is that they will then both play the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy.
Remark. It is well-known in biology that animals who contest a resource many times avoid fighting, and thereby avoid damage, by way of judging each other's strength. Contestants also often try to impress each other by demonstrating or exaggerating their body size, muscular strength, and/or vocal resources (gorilla males beating their chests, dogs burring up their fur, frogs blowing up their cheeks, etc.). Usually, fights occur only if the two contestants appear approximately equally strong. Arguably, similar phenomena, including avoidance of fights with predictable outcomes, are common also among humans. For mathematical models of animal fighting, see Enquist and Leimar (1984 , 1987 ). right-most distribution was created for λ = 1. Hence, in almost all matchings, the rich individual then plays H and the poor D; they play the mixed equilibrium only if they have identical wealth (more exactly if their wealth difference is less than ln 2, which is always the case since this is less than 1, the smallest unit of wealth). As expected, the greater λ results in higher average wealth:w increases from approximately 10.2 to approximately 16.6. 11 At the same time inequality rises; the standard deviation increases from approximately 13.8 to approximately 16.9. Moreover, unlike in the original model (λ = 0), a positive λ induces a "lock-in" effect: once rich, it is easier for an individual to become even richer. For the sake of brevity, we leave also this extension for future studies, and note that this extension, unlike the first one, requires extension also of the mathematical-statistical analysis.
Fixed background income
We have analyzed the strategic interaction as if it were the only source of wealth. A simple and natural extension of the above analysis would be to let all individuals also have other incomes, apart from playing the Hawk-Dove game. 12 To be specific, suppose that all individuals earn an exogenous and fixed income y per unit of time, where y is an even positive integer. (This income can be thought of as net income after consumption.) The income adds to the individual's wealth and is exposed to the same depreciation. Such a steady income flow can be easily introduced in the present model by adding wealth y/2 to both individuals after their strategic interaction. Since the time rate at which an individual is called upon to play the game is 2, this would result in an average income rate of y. Consequently, average steadystate wealth would increase by y/δ. Technically, all results hold, mutatis mutandi. In particular, the propagation of chaos equation (4) in Theorem 2 generalizes to
Accordingly, the equations in the corollary generalize to
We note that unless the background income is very low (more precisely, if y ≥ 2c), all individuals' wealth is always non-negative.
Discussion
The present model is but a simple example of a more general modelling paradigm, whereby economic activity takes place in small randomly assembled groups. The members of each such group interact strategically with each other, and the interaction may concern production, trade, bargaining, public goods provision, etc. As a result of these interactions, individuals gain or lose wealth.
The aim of the present study was to work out an analytical framework that permits rigorous mathematical analysis, a framework that can later be extended and generalized to richer and more realistic models. For instance, instead of having only one game, there could be a family of games that are randomly drawn, where the interacting individuals would learn what game is at hand and adapt their behavior accordingly. It may also be relevant to give individuals the option of not taking part in an interaction, which can easily be done by adding a pure strategy, that if chosen by at least one individual, leaves all individuals' wealth levels untouched. 13 .
We hope that the present model framework, in suitably extended forms, may help understand mechanisms behind wealth distributions found in economics, such as in the much discussed book by Piketty (2014) . In a lucid essay (in Swedish), Molander (2014) discusses how inequality may arise from small variations at the micro level. More specifically, Molander shows how even slight differences in bargaining power may induce wide wealth dispersion. The Hawk-Dove game can be interpreted as a rough bargaining model, so the present study adds to that discussion. An interesting avenue for further research would be to analyze a richer class of bargaining games within the present framework.
We here model depreciation in a rather drastic way: now and then an individual loses all his or her wealth. More realistically, small amounts of wealth now and then become valueless. A more natural way to model depreciation would then be to let each unit of wealth be exposed to i.i.d. depreciation shocks. We avoided this second approach since it would seem to make the "propagation of chaos" calculations much harder. However, it would seem worthwhile to explore this possibility further, at least in numerical simulations.
An important ingredient that is missing in the present model framework is consumption. Of course, what we here call depreciation can be thought of as consumption. However, this is a rather mechanical way of treating such an activity. An extension to include endogenous consumption decisions would be very valuable.
To mention but one more potential extensions: endogeneity of opportunity values and their arrival rate. Arguably, the value and arrival rate of opportunities for economic interactions is increasing in national wealth, at any given population size. Such endogenous growth may turn the ergodic wealth process into a so-called explosive Markov process. While such generalizations may raise substantial mathematical challenges, they would be relevant for understanding real-world phenomena. With today's computer power, numerical simulations could give new insights and suggest conjectures that later may be proved theoretically.
To the best of our knowledge, the present model is not closely related to any model in the economics literature. It shares some features with some models in the search literature, such as Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) . The topics of wealth and growth are of course big in economics, but the models used differ starkly from ours. Perhaps elaborations of the present model could help shed more light on some of the issues treated there. Our main contribution in this context is to provide a clear and rigorous mathematical framework, that, even in its present simple form generates wealth distributions with features discussed in the economics literature. We believe that even slight generalizations of the present model may enable rigorous analysis of factors that determine not only national wealth but also the wealth distribution within countries.
Appendix
Let N ∈ N be population size, and let F denote the state-space, where either F = Z N or F = R. A stochastic process X = (X(t)) t≥0 in F is a random variable taking values in D(R + , F ), the space of right-continuous functions, from [0, +∞) to F , with left limits. To define a Markov process, or continuous-time Markov chain, in F we need an initial distribution at time zero, a probability measure π on F , and a transition matrix, to be called the rate matrix, denoted (A(x, y) y) is the rate of transition of the process from state x to state y. The generator associated with this matrix is the bounded linear operator A that sends all bounded and Borel measurable functions f from F to R, such that for all x ∈ F :
Conversely, from a given generator one can construct the associated rate matrix from the factors by which the differences [f (y) − f (x)] are multiplied in the expression of the generator.
Let A be a rate matrix and let π be a probability measure on F . We can construct a Markov process X as follows: First, let (Y (n)) n be a Markov chain in F with initial distribution π and with transition matrix A(x,y) |A(x,x)| . 14 Let ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 ,. . . , be independent and exponentially distributed random variables with mean-value 1, the time intervals between arrivals, and assume that they are statistically independent of the chain Y (.). Define the Markov process (X(t)) t in F , with initial distribution π and generator A, by:
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Let N be a positive integer, and let (W N n ) n∈N * be the Markov chain associated with the Markov process (W N t ) t∈R + . Evidently (W N n ) n is an irreducible chain on (γZ) N , where γ ∈ N is the greatest common divisor of v/2 and c. Let [I] be the following hypothesis:
[I] ∃(p, q) ∈ N 2 such that pv/2 − qc = γ and 2q ∈ cN. 14 We allow for the possibility that A(x, x) = 0, in which case we define the ratio 
We denote by T this collection of mappings applications. For all integers k ≥ h and i, j ∈ {1, . . . N } such that i = j, let f k,h (i, j) be the following composition of mappings from the collection T :
For any positive integers
for N even, and for N odd:
We then have
We are now in a position to analyze the process W N . By definition,
for all w ∈ Z N and all mappings g ∈ T . Hence, for all positive integers k ≥ h and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N } such that i = j:
It follows that there exists an n 0 ∈ N such that It has the following ergodicity property: For all f ∈ C b (Z N ) and all initial states x ∈ Z N :
In other words, the time average of any function f ∈ C b (Z N ) converges with probability one to its mean-value under the invariant distribution. This result follows from Theorem 1.10.2 in Norris (1997). Moreover since P (0,0,...,0) W N 1 = (0, . . . , 0) ≥ δ/2 and δ > 0, the chain (W N n ) n is also aperiodic. From this it follows (see Theorem 2.2.1 in Strook (2014) that there exists a γ ∈ (0, 1) and a K ∈ R + such that, for all initial states x ∈ Z N ,
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Let (u N ) N ∈N be a sequence of symmetric probability measures u N on Z N . Following Sznitman (1991), we say that (u N ) N is u-chaotic, with u a probability measure on Z, if, for any finite collection {φ 1 , . . . , φ k } of continuous and bounded functions on Z,
The meaning of this definition, if we apply it to a fixed and finite number of individuals, when the total number N of individuals in the population goes to infinity, these individuals' wealth levels become i.i.d. with distribution u. The infinitesimal generator of (W N 1 , . . . , W N N ) is A N g defined in (33). This generator has the shape of a particle system with particles (or individuals) playing 2×2-games. Then we adapt the proofs of Theorem 4.6 and Corollary 4.7 of Gibaud (2016) . The generator of the full dimensional process
with e i being the i th unit vector, andA N d defined in (33). Considering f constant everywhere except on the first component, we are in a position to model the action on one individual the following generator L with domain
Let us follow the proof of Lemma 4.8 in Gibaud (2016) We recall that ∀k = h ∈ {1, . . . , N } 2 and ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N }, N i and N i,j are statistically independent. Define the associated compensated Poisson processes as follows:
For any individual i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, it can be shown that the process M f,N i is a square-integrable martingale, and that, for any N ∈ N * and all integers
In order to establish this, we take again use the proof of Lemma 4.9 in Gibaud (2016). By the same arguments as given there, and noting that M 1. We have to replace ∀t ≥ 0 : (X(t), Z(t)) by (X(t)) and L µu by L.
We have to replace (Y
. . is replaced by:
. Then we get [Part 2: Depreciation] To deal with depreciation, we define an independent Poisson process, also with intensity N . At each arrival time of this Poisson process one individual is randomly drawn for wealth depreciation, as described in Section 2.
We here consider a more general depreciation process, whereby depreciation is not total depleting. Instead, when an individual is drawn for depreciating, his or her wealth probabilistically decreases, if positive, or probabilistically increases, if negative. In other words, an individual's wealth does not change sign but probabilistically shrinks in absolute value. For any k ∈ N, let ρ k h = P(Bin(k, δ) = h). We denote I k = {0, . . . , k} if k > 0 and I k = {−k, . . . , 0} if k < 0, and I 0 = {0}. In the case of depreciation by complete depletion, treated in the main text, we let 
We are now in a position to construct the Markov process that defines average wealth. The evolution of average wealth (w N (t)) t is determined bȳ A N (µ N ), where µ N is the empirical measure described in Section 2, andĀ N is a non-linear generator defined as follows. Since f is smooth with compact support, the term o(1) is compactly supported and goes to zero as N goes to +∞. The same reasoning applied to |||Ā N g −Ā g ||| establishes that the operator converges.
We recognizeĀ N as the generator of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with σ = 0. Hence, a process associated withĀ is (w(t)) t , defined by
Finally, since we have established the convergence of the generators, applying Thm 6.1 of Chapter 3 in Ethier and Kurtz (1986) [with, for all n ∈ N, π n being the injection from L n = C ∞ c (R) to L = C b (R)], we have the following convergence result,
for all w 0 ∈ R, f ∈ C ∞ c (R) and t > 0, wherew (·) is the solution of (34) with initial condition w(0) = w 0 .
